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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4544
___________
IN RE:  ALTON D. BROWN,
     Petitioner
____________________________________
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 08-cv-00026)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
January 6, 2011
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Alton D. Brown seeks a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to rule on a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
he contends remains pending in the District Court.  Although we agree that the motion
remains pending and that the District Court is obligated to rule on it, mandamus is not
warranted in this case.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition.
I.
Brown, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed and twice amended a civil rights
complaint against his prison warden and other defendants.  The District Court initially
granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  The defendants later moved to
2dismiss the second amended complaint.  They argued, among other things, that Brown’s
IFP status should be revoked because he has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
The District Court referred their motions to a Magistrate Judge, who recommended that it
revoke Brown’s IFP status and dismiss the action without prejudice to his ability to
reopen it by paying the filing fee within sixty days.  The District Court adopted the
recommendation by order entered March 5, 2010.
Brown then filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration.  The District
Court referred that motion as well to the Magistrate Judge, who entered an order
purportedly denying it on March 25, 2010.  Brown filed a notice of appeal to this Court,
and later filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order with the District Court.  On
appeal, we denied Brown’s motion for leave to proceed IFP because he has “three strikes”
and did not show the requisite imminent danger under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  (C.A. No.
10-2212, Sept. 21, 2010 order.)  We ultimately dismissed his appeal for his failure to pay
the filing fee.  In our order denying Brown leave to appeal IFP, we noted that, even if he
paid the filing fee, the appeal would be considered for dismissal due to a jurisdictional
defect because the appeal was from a Magistrate Judge’s order and Brown’s objections to
that order remained pending in the District Court.  Those objections remain pending as of
the date of this opinion.  
II.
Brown now seeks a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to rule on his
Rule 59(e) motion.  He argues that the Magistrate Judge could not properly decide the
motion and that a final decision must be rendered by the District Court.  We agree.  The
3parties did not consent to have proceedings conducted by the Magistrate Judge under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).  Thus, although the Magistrate Judge’s order purported to deny Brown’s
Rule 59(e) motion, it must be construed as a recommendation under 28 U.S.C §
636(b)(1)(B).  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(B) (authorizing magistrate judges
to recommend dispositions of, but not decide, dispositive motions); United States v.
Polishan, 336 F.3d 234, 240 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that a purported dispositive
decision by a Magistrate Judge under § 636(b)(1)(B) is not a final order but is instead a
“recommendation that must be accepted, rejected or modified by the district court”); see
also Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2010) (“denial of [a Rule 59(e)]
motion for reconsideration is a final order”); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307,
311 (3d Cir. 2001) (order denying IFP status is a final order).  Accordingly, Brown’s Rule
59(e) remains pending before the District Court, and the District Court is obligated to rule
on it.
Nevertheless, a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to do so is not
warranted in this case.  Brown filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s order with the
District Court, and those objections have been pending for approximately seven months. 
“Although this delay is of concern, it does not yet rise to the level of a denial of due
process.”  Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing seven-month
delay).  Given the posture of this case, it may be that the District Court is simply unaware
of its obligation to rule on Brown’s motion.  Now that we have clarified that issue,
however, “[w]e are confident that the district court will issue its decision shortly.”  Id. 
Thus, the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is not warranted in this case.
4Brown also seeks a writ of mandamus directing the District Court to (1) “uphold”
an alleged agreement permitting his claims to proceed against certain parties if he
dismissed them as to certain others, and (2) review the record regarding that alleged
agreement.  Brown relied on the alleged agreement in opposing defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and he sought reconsideration on the grounds that the District Court failed to
review the record in that regard.  These arguments may be grounds for an appeal if the
District Court denies his motion for reconsideration, but they are not grounds for
mandamus.  See id. at 79 (explaining that mandamus is not warranted where a subsequent
appeal constitutes an “adequate means of relief”).  Brown’s “three strikes” may
effectively prevent him from appealing if he once again is unable to satisfy the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), but a mandamus petition may not be used “to evade
the [Prison Litigation Reform Act].”  Id. at 78.
Accordingly, Brown’s petition is denied.  This denial is without prejudice to Brown’s
ability to file another mandamus petition if the District Court does not act on his Rule
59(e) motion within sixty days of the date of this opinion.  See id. at 79.  We, of course,
express no opinion on the merits of Brown’s motion or his objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s order. 
